PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

In Laughead v. H. C. Frick Coke Co., 58 Atl. 685, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, laying down the general prinall
Performance: ciple that an accord is sufficiently executed when
satisfacin
accept
to
agrees
party
the
which
is done
Conclusiveness

tion bf his claim, and, when so executed, it is a bar

to the remedy under the old contract, decides that where the
plaintiff holds a disputed claim against the defendant for unliquidated damages, and he accepts a certain amount in cash and an
agreement for employment in another company when a certain
contingency arises which makes such employment possible, it is
a complete accord and satisfaction, and the person who gave the
receipt in full cannot recover on his original contract. Compare
Hasler v. Hursl, 151 Pa. 415. .
ATTACHMENT.

In National Broadway Bank v. Sampson, 71 N. E. 766,
it is held by the Court of Appeals of New York that the personal service of a warrant of attachment on a nonresident partner of a foreign limited partnership for
a debt due to a foreign corporation, and having a foreign situs,
is invalid, the partner being temporarily in the state. Compare
Plimpton v. Biglow, 93 N. Y. 592.
BANKRUPTCY.

The Supreme Court of Florida (Division A) decides in
Beasley v. Coggins, 37 S. 213, that a trustee in bankruptcy appointed under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
Trustee:
Fraudulent of 1898 occupies a relation similar to that of a judgConveyance. ment creditor of the bankrupt, and may file a bill in
equity to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real estate by the
bankrupt, although neither he (the trustee) nor any creditor
has reduced any claim against the bankrupt to judgment. See
In re Mullen, IOI Fed. 413.
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BANKS.

In Stone v. Rottman, 82 S. W. 76, the Supreme Court of
Missouri (Division No. 2), holding that the director of a bank
Directors:
is only required to act in good faith and to exercise
Negligence
such a degree of care as a reasonably prudent man
would exercise under the same circumstances, not that which a
prudent man would exercise in his own business, applies this
principle to the following facts: A statute of Missouri declares
that a bank may sell all kinds of property coming into its hands
as collateral security for loans, but forbids an investment of
funds in trade or commerce. A bank, on a sale of corporate
stock of a corporation which it held as security, purchased the
stock, and through its officers ran the company, which traded in
coal, for four years at a continual loss: Held, that the directors
of the bank were liable for the loss in a'suit by the receiver. Compare Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 14o.

It is held by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in
Callahanv. Bank of Anderson, 48 S. E. 293, that where a bank
Refusal to
refused to pay a check drawn by a depositor in favor
Pay Check
of a third party, in the absence of notice to the
depositor that the bank had applied the fund on deposit in extinguishment of past-due claims held against him by the bank
when he had deposited with the bank a sum sufficient to make
payment of the check, the bank was liable to the depositor for
the resulting damages. The court is equally divided, however,
upon the question, and seems to hold thus merely because the
lower court so held. See Hardware Co. v. Bank, 41 S. C. 177.
It is decided by the Court of Appeals of New York in
Haniza v. Lyon, 71 N. E. 778, that though directors are liable
to a bank which has suffered loss through their
Against
negligence, and any stockholder may prosecute an acDirectors
tion for himself and others in a similar situation
where the bank does not bring the action after demand, or without demand when the officers who committed the wrong are still
directors, plaintiff must be a stockholder at the time of the commission of the acts complained of and at the time of the commencement of the action.
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CODE PLEADING.

A decision of interest and importance in those states in
which the code system of pleading is established is rendered by
co-uterthe Supreme Court of North Dakota in Wrege v.
'uWM

Jones, ioo N. W. 705.

It is there held that the pro-

vision of the code, which is found in practically every code state,
permitting a defendant to plead as a counterclaim "a cause of
action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in
the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim," does
not authorize one slander to be set up against another, although
both are uttered at the same time and place and in the same conversation. Each slander constitutes a separate transaction within
the meaning of the above section. Compare Anderson v. Hill,
53 Barb. 239.
CONSIDERATION.

In Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions v. Smith, 58
Atl. 689, the following facts appear: Defendant's testator promised in writing to give a certain sum to a foreign misSubsciption
sionary society, the sum to be expended in foreign
mission work in a particular field in memory of the donor's
mother. The society accepted the obligation, received a payment
on account, and sent missionaries to the particular field designated, and did not attempt to raise funds for the prosecution of
missionary work in such particular province. Under these facts
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides that a sufficient consideration was present to render the contract binding. Compare
with this decision Maine CentralInstitute v. Haskell, 73 Me. 14o.
CONSPIRACY.

In State v. Stockford, 58 Ati. 759, the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut deals with the questions so frequently
Sts
.arising when a strike is ordered, and announces a
decision which will undoubtedly become a precedent
of importance. Too many matters are passed upon to permit
a full statement of the case in this part of the REGISTER, but the
case is of such importance as not to allow reference to it to be
omitted.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

It is decided by the New York Supreme Court (Appellate
Division, First Department) in People v. Beattie, 89 N. Y. Supp.
193, that a statute regulating the business of horseDue Process
of Law
shoeing, and requiring a person practising such business to be examined and to obtain a certificate from a board of
examiners and file the same with the court clerk where the person
proposes to practise such trade, is not a valid exercise of the
state's police power, but is an arbitrary interference with personal
liberty and private property without due process of law. Compare the Illinois decision in Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334.
A statute of California passed in 19o3 provided that the
compensation which an employment agent might receive should
Police Power

be limited to ten per cent. of a month's wages in the

employment furnished. In E.%parte Dickey, 77 Pac.
924, the Supreme Court of that state decided that such statute
is not within the police power but contravenes the constitutional
guaranty of protection in the possession of property. One judge
dissents. Both opinions refer to the decision in Holden v. Hardy,
169 U. S. 366, but apply its principle in different ways. The
dissenting judge regards the matter as one within the discretion
of the legislature to decide whether the public welfare required
such limitation of the right of contract, and there being nothing
to show an abuse of such discretion on the part of a legislature,
contends that the court has no power to interfere.
In State v. Ide, 77 Pac. 961, the Supreme Court of Washington holds an act of the legislature empowering a city to im-uniformity

pose on and select from every male inhabitant be-

tween the ages of twenty-one and fifty years an annual
street poll-tax not exceeding two dollars, but exempting from
liability for such tax members of volunteer fire companies, and
an ordinance of such city passed in pursuance thereof, and
linliting such taxes to the persons contained in such class, to be
unconstitutional on the ground of non-uniformity. The Chief
Justice dissents.
of Taxation
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CONTRACTS.

In Hines v. Union Savings Bank and Trut Co., 48 S. E.
120, the Supreme Court of Georgia decides that mere knowledge
by a lender of money that the borrower intends to
Loan:
negal use it for an illegal or immoral purpose will not
Purpose of
prevent a recovery of the money loaned. It is thereBOrrOWer

fore held that a plea to an action to
foreclose a mort-

gage on realty given to secure the payment of a note, which sets
up that the money loaned was used for an illegal and immoral
purpose, to wit, the suppression of a threatened criminal prosecution of the defendant's husband, and that the bank knew, or had
reasonable grounds to suspect, the purpose for which the money
was borrowed, but which does not charge that the lender participated in the illegal transaction, or did anything to further
the consummation of the unlawful design, sets forth no valid
defence and is properly stricken off on demurrer. With this
case should be compared the decision of the same court in Jones
v. Dannenberg Co., 112 Ga. 426.
DAMAGES.

In E. W. Bliss Co. v. Buffalo Tin Can Co., 131 Fed. 51
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Second Circuit)
manufacture
of Machinery

decides that in an action for breach of a contract
for the manufacture and sale of machinery the

buyers' measure of damages was the difference between the contract price and the market value of the machinery at the time
and place where it was to be delivered, or, if there was no market
value, then the difference between the contract price and what it
would have cost the buyer to have the machinery mamifactured;
and this though the plaintiff did not attempt to have equivalent
machinery made. With this case compare Star Brewery Co. v.
Horst, 58 C. C. A. 363, and note thereto.
EASEMENTS.

It is decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Gibbons v.
Ebding, 71 N. E. 720, that the owner of the servient estate may
Interference
with Ease-

ments

use the land for any purpose that does not interfere
with the easement, and in the absence of anything in

the deed or in the circumstances under which it
was
acquired or used showing that a way is to be an open one, he
may put gates or bars across it unless they would unreasonably
interfere with its use.
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EQUITY.

In McKee v. City of Grand Rapids, ioo N. W. 580, the
Supreme Court of Michigan decides that though water in a
Jurisdiction: channel of a stream constitutes a nuisance because of
Impraciits stagnant condition, one will not be compelled to

cableRemedy

undo his work in preventing certain water
flowing

into it, such relief being ineffectual.
EVIDENCE.

It is decided by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
in State v. Kelly, 58 At]. 7o5, that where the defendant, accused
Suicide:
of poisoning his wife, claimed that she committed
Intent
suicide, evidence of her declaration of a purpose to
take her own life, made within two months before her death, was
admissible, but that some similar declarations made by deceased
from eleven months to three or four years before her death were
inadmissible as too remote. Compare State v. Fitzgerald, 13o
Mo. 407.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Against the dissent of one judge, the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals (First Circuit) decides in James v. Gray, 131
Fed. 4Ol, that a loan made by a wife to her husband
Debts Pable in Bankfrom her separate estate is provable as a debt against
ruptcy
his estate in bankruptcy without regard to its enforceability under the law of the state, the contract being valid
in equity, by the principles of which courts of bankruptcy are
governed; and there is no distinction in such respect between an
estate to the wife's separate use as known to equity and a separate
estate created by statute. Compare In re Talbot, IOO Fed. 924.
LIBEL.

In Starr Pub. Co. v. Donahoe, 58 Atl. 513, the Supreme
Court of Delaware decides that if allegations of fact in a newspaper, charging a candidate for office with a criminal
Privilege
offence, are false, they are not privileged, and good
faith and probable cause are not a defence. The case is a very
excellent and exhaustive discussion of the question involved and
is well worthy of study.
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MORTGAGES.

Where a second mortgagee was not made a party to a suit
to foreclose the first mortgage, and at the time suit was brought
Priority:
Foreclosure:
Limitations

to foreclose the second mortgage the time limited by

law for suing on the first mortgage had fully elapsed,
the second mortgagee was entitled to plead the

Statute of Limitations as a complete defence to any rights acquired under the first mortgage: Supreme Court of California in
Frates v. Lears, 77 Pac. 905. Compare Carpentierv. Brenham,
40 Cal. 221.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of Michigan decides in Leggett v. City
of Detroit, ioo N. W. 566, that a city in accepting a deed of land
for part of a street acts for the general public or
Powers:
Openingof
state, and has no power to agree that in consideration
streets
therefor the other land of the grantor in the
addition
in which is the land deeded shall be exempt from any future
assessment for opening or extending the street. This decision is
interesting in connection with the cases bearing upon the right of
a legislature to contract with a corporation for a limited power
of taxation. Compare Township v. Supervisors, 117 Mich. 217.
*A case growing out of the construction of the New York
Subway is found in Haefelin v. McDonald, 89 N. Y. Supp. 395,
where the New York Supreme Court (Appellate
Public
Works:
Division, First Department) lays down the general
Negligence
rule that where a city does not construct certain public work through its agents -or servants, but contrac for the
performance thereof, it could not be made liable for negligence
in the manner in which the work was performed, but holds, nevertheless, that, since under the New York laws providing for the
construction of a subway in the city of New York, the city was
required to approve the plans and specifications prepared by the
board of rapid transit railway commissioners, the city was bound
to exercise reasonable care, to adopt plans and specifications which
could be performed without injury to adjoining property, which
duty could not be delegated. One judge dissents. Compare
Vrooman v. Turncr, 69 N. Y. 280.
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NEGLIGENCE.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Parsons v.
Charleston Consol. Ry., Gas and Electric Co., 48 S. E. 282, that
where an electric company negligently fails to inElectricity
sulate its wires, so that an adjacent fallen telephone
wire becomes charged with a deadly current and causes death,
the electric company is liable without regard to its actual knowledge of the fallen wire or its diligence in discovering it. See also
McKay v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 31 L. R. A. 589, and note
thereto.
PARENT AND CHILD.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming decides in Jones v. Bozman, 77 Pac. 439, that since the provisions of the statutes of
Wyoming prohibit any distinction being made on acCustody o
Child:
count of religious belief, the courts will give no
Religion
weight to evidence of religious opinions in a proceeding to determine the custody of a minor child, the difficulties and
disagreements as to which arose between those concerned from
their differences in religious matters. This case also contains an
interesting discussion of the extent to which a foreign judgment
in regard to the custody of a child will be considered by the court
of another state in which the question is raised. People ex. rel.
Lucy Allen v. William H. Allen, lO5 N. Y. 628.
PARTNERSHIP.

In Preston v. Garrard,48 S.E. 118, the Supreme Court of
Georgia decides that where a partnership is dissolved by the retirement of one of the partners, and the continuing
Dissolution:
Liabilityfor
Debts

partner agrees to assume the debts of the firm, the

retiring partner becomes a surety for his copartner.
It is accordingly held that a creditor of the partnership, who has
notice of the dissolution and of the agreement by the continuing
partner to assumne the debts, is bound thereafter to accord to the
retiring partner all the rights of a surety. Hence, if, without
his knowledge or consent, the creditor takes from the continuing
partner a renewal of the firm indebtedness, and extends the time
of payment thereof, the retiring partner is released from the in-
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PARTNERSHIP (Continued).

debtedness, and the creditor must thereafter look only to the firm
assets and to the individual assets of the continuing partner. Compare FirstNational Bank v. Ells, 68 Ga. 192.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Third Circuit)
decides in Zeigler v. Hallahan, 131 Fed. 205, that in determining
Alteration of

whether a surety is discharged by an alteration of the

principal's contract without his consent, the question
is not whether the change was or could be prejudicial to him,
but whether it effected a material alteration of the agreement
and, if it did, he is discharged, though the change was beneficial
to him. See Guaranty Company v. PressedBrick Co., 191 U. S.
416.
Contract

RAILROADS.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides in Hendler v.
Lehigh Valley R. Co., 58 Atl. 486, that a railroad company can
Rights in
use without further compensation all suitable mateRight of Way
rial, except timber, on the right of way which it has
acquired for the construction of its road through the property of
the landowner, but where it takes material for its own use from
a point outside of its right of way it is liable to the landowner
for the value.
TRUST.

The Court of Appeals of New York holds In -ie Totton,
71 N. E. 748, that where a person deposited his own money in a
Sufciency of

savings bank in his own name as trustee for another

it did not establish, an irrevocable trust during the
lifetime of the depositor, but is revocable at will unless the depositor completes the gift by some unequivocal act during his
lifetime, or unless the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation. This question, which has more than once been
considered by courts, is discussed, with great care, and former
cases reviewed. Compare Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134.
Act creating
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WILLS.

The Supreme Court of Ohio in Bodmann German Protestant
Widows' Home v. Lippardt, 71 N. E. 770, decides that a will

reading, "I give and bequeath to my beloved wife
.
.
all my estate, both real and personal, of which
I am now possessed, or shall afterwards come into my possession,
or under my control, by deed or otherwise, in fee simple, with
power to sell or dispose of it as she may see fit: and that after
the death of my wife, if there is anything remaining of my personal or real estate, it shall be distributed in the following manner,
to wit," gives the widow power to convey the fee of the whole
or any part of the real estate; and a deed making such a conveyance, good as against the widow, is good against the second
devisee. The case is a valuable review of the principles involved.
Consideration
of Devise

An interesting case in regard to specific legacies is found in
the decision of the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Divispif

sion, Fourth Department) in Waldo v. Hayes, 89

N. Y. Supp. 69, where it is held that where testatrix's
will gave a legatee her "diamond brooch" and gave another
"jewelry not otherwise disposed of," and the brooch testatrix
had when the will was executed was subsequently disposed of, but
at her death she had another, it passed to the one to whom the
brooch was given in the will, and not as jewelry "not otherwise
disposed of." See also VanVechten v. VanVechten, 8 Paige lO4.
Legacy

